“The Want of Accurate Maps”: On Using Period Maps in Research for the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.14713/njs.v9i2.333

This paper presents an analysis of period military maps associated with the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse, and in so doing, encourages researchers of such maps to consult the perspective of the mapmaker and the context surrounding the document. Modernity tends to consider maps as accurate, objective portrayals of events, and modern scholars are overly critical or dismissive of historic maps when divergent or inaccurate features are presented. This mindset may not be appropriate; period maps should not be thought of as merely historic versions of today’s satellite images, but rather as depicting the perspective of the draftsman or commissioner of the map, which of itself may harbor important insights to discover.

In examining this point, American, French, British, and Hessian maps developed in the aftermath of the battle were consulted, focusing on the important features of each illustration, the backgrounds of the relevant draftsmen and/or commissioners, and their possible motivations and objectives in making the maps. The ultimate goal emphasized by this piece is that the wise historical researcher of military maps from this period should remember that the depiction of positions and events should be perceived through the eyes of the individuals responsible for the map’s creation, and not taken at face value.

Introduction

Research does not originate in a vacuum; as the old adage states, when you answer one question, three more questions arise. While conducting the research for the authors’ previous article, “Artillery Supported by Infantry: The Royal Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth
Courthouse,” as more primary source maps were referenced, a variety of differences appeared.\(^1\) These inconsistencies led to referencing additional period maps, which, instead of resolving the discrepancies, presented even more variables. A detailed analysis of these differences proved to be too cumbersome and tangential for that paper at that time. It convinced the authors, however, that an in-depth re-evaluation of the original maps of the Battle of Monmouth was overdue and would greatly enhance future research and continued interpretation of the history of the battle. As the breadth of the variations grew, and the potential significance this implied, it became necessary to present them in some cohesive manner, resulting in this article.

Traditionally, the discussion of battle maps has centered around troop movements and positions and the accuracy of the terrain and roads. The older the battle in discussion, the harder it becomes to argue accuracy versus evolution of the location when discussing the land features, both natural and man-made. Modernity tends to consider maps as accurate, objective portrayals of events, and modern scholars tend to be overly critical of historic maps when divergent features or inaccurate geospatial data is presented.\(^2\) This mindset may not be appropriate, especially for maps prior to the 20th century; period maps should not be thought of as merely historic versions of today’s satellite images. Period maps, including the maps of this battle, really depict the perspective of the draftsman or commissioner of the map. Depiction of positions and events are perceived through the eyes of the individuals responsible for the map’s creation.

Battle maps do not rely heavily on accuracy of the terrain unless it directly relates to the ebb and flow of the battle. These maps concentrate on chronicling the course of the battle from the

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perspective of the information that the maker of the map is given from the official reports and/or interviews with officers and men involved. The source material for the maps used for this study comes primarily from participants involved in the Battle of Monmouth, both from the Continental and British perspectives. Perhaps it is true to say that these maps are not objective witnesses of the events of the battle but subjective portrayals of the creator’s point of view. Additionally, it may be best to think of these maps as coming out of a fish-eye perspective, where clarity gets lost the further away one gets from the center; what remains clear is what the draftsman or the map’s commissioner wished to focus on, while everything else of lesser import can become blurry or distorted.

**Purpose and Usage**

To begin this analysis of primarily 18th century maps of the battle, it is best to first look at the purpose, usage, and original intent of the maps in question. When doing research with these maps, it must be kept in mind that maps were drawn for different purposes and at different times, such as prior to, during, and after a battle. As exemplified by Douglas W. Marshall in an article on British engineers in America from 1755 to 1783: “memorial maps represent finished maps, usually with a dedication in commemoration of a battle. Terrain maps are crude in form, often drawn on the spot to indicate roads or lines of march. Engineer drafts are drawings of fortifications to illustrate proposed construction or alteration.”

3 For the purposes of this discussion, maps from the period fit within three categories: operational maps, maps made and used for academic settings, and, finally, maps designed for a specific intention from a unique vantage point. These three categories are not presented in a set chronology, but are more organic in nature; in fact, like a Venn

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diagram, many of these maps can exist in more than one category, having multiple purposes and providing for multiple usages.

The first category, operational maps, includes survey maps and sketches used in preparing for the operations of a military campaign. General George Washington noted the great importance of this type of map, writing two letters to Congress in 1777 stating:

The want of accurate maps of the country, which has hitherto been the scene of war, has been of great disadvantage to me. I have in vain endeavored to procure them, and have been obliged to make shift with such sketches as I could trace out from my own observation, and that of gentlemen around me. I really think, if gentlemen of known character and probity could be employed in making maps, from actual surveys, of the roads, of the rivers and bridges and fords over them, and of the mountains and passes through them, it would be of the greatest advantage . . .

A good Geographer to survey the Roads and take sketches of the Country where the Army is to act, would be extremely useful and might be attended with exceeding valuable consequences . . .

These maps were designed to offer field commanders the physical dimensions of the terrain ahead of their respective forces, providing them with relevant spatial data necessary to plan and discuss future force movements and campaign objectives. Some of these maps were accurate, in the case of survey maps performed by trained engineers and surveyors; others were less so, as in quickly made in situ field sketches, whose main objective was to present only spatial relationships. They very seldom provided accurate details on friendly, allied, or adversarial positions; if depicted at all, they may have been made nebulously at best. It should be reiterated that these “valuable” maps were designed to be utilized only in the planning stages of military operations; they were not meant to plot troop movements once the campaign had begun, nor were they supposed to be used to keep track of these forces in combat once the actual fighting commenced. Throughout the course of this

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study, none of the maps analyzed fit within this category specifically; however, these maps may have served as the preliminary basis for later maps in other categories.

Unlike operational maps, which had practical purposes during actual conflict, the maps of the second category, maps made for academic purposes, were used for discussion and presentations after the conflict had occurred. In preparing these maps, accounts of participants were often utilized to depict troop position and movement, which were not typically present in maps of the first category. These maps were often used for training and education. This type of map was famously used by such military leaders as Prussian King Frederick II, also known as “Frederick the Great,” in his professional development of war games, staff rides (educationally oriented tours of a battlefield), and military leadership academies. This “father of the modern army” favored the creation of battlefield maps, both actual and hypothetical, in order to train his army’s officers, applying the scenarios and lessons of these maps and other historical studies and practical exercises in a tactical analysis in order to improve the professional standards of his officers and the army as a whole.6

Frederick the Great created cadet schools based on these principles in order to groom the future military leaders of his army; the focus centered on lectures in geography, battle maps, and engineer sketches of fortifications during the winter months, while the spring and summer allowed for practical applications of these studies through tactical rides and war games. The king even launched special short-term courses focused heavily on these tenets for his most promising future leaders; in fact, in 1762, a young Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, then an aide-de-camp to the king

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and, later, the chief trainer of Washington’s army at Valley Forge and an eventual Major General in the Continental service, attended such a course personally conducted by the monarch himself.  

The British, too, were well acquainted with the importance of the academic battle map, as seen with the extensive usage of maps at the Royal Artillery Academy at Woolwich. On July 9, 1785, a short two years after the conclusion of the American Revolution, a display of textbook artillery and infantry demonstrations for a hypothetical “mock” battle were conducted on the grounds of Woolwich Common and were witnessed by King George III of Great Britain and his royal entourage. This choreographed event was depicted in a series of nine engraved plans bound in a program, akin to a theatrical playbill, showing the progression of maneuvers, each accompanied with a commentary of the action presented. The forces that participated in this war game were two battalions of the Royal Artillery, while the role of the infantry forces was filled by the Corps of Cadets from the Woolwich Academy. The maps fit into the academic category in that they preserve these hallmark actions for study by future cadets on the proper formations and movements of artillery supported by infantry in a combat scenario.

The third category, maps designed for a specific intention from a unique vantage point, were often used by certain individuals or entities to show a specific interpretation of the event in question. These maps originate from the unique perspective of the mapmaker, or, in many instances, the map’s commissioner that had employed the cartographer to create the map. These maps can be simply a chronicling of events beheld, or they can be used to influence others. This influence could be brought to bear to justify a previous undertaking or could be used to sway others to support a cause or a course of action.

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7 Hall, “Battlefield Tour and Staff Ride,” 94–95.
The Woolwich artillery map collection previously mentioned is also a good example of this category; while serving its role in pure academia, it is also serving as an influencer. The series was commissioned by the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, to accompany the artillery maneuvers performed for the king. It is meant to describe the event in each of its phases; it is also a testament to the academy’s training and the professionalism of the Royal Artillery and its cadets. It is interesting to note that this series now sits in the King George III private collection of military and naval maps, a collection that he meticulously put together over the entire span of his reign; to further extrapolate the intent of the items, these engravings also served as a demonstration to the British nation, and the world at large, of the prowess and might of the British artillery under George III. As the Woolwich maps exemplify, battle maps can also exist in multiple categories. Though often not originally conceived for multiple purposes, the practical usage of a map can form the bridge into other categories.9

Presenting the Maps

Based upon the concepts outlined in the previous sections, the following is a presentation of maps of the Battle of Monmouth derived from the accounts of participants. For organizational purposes, this study will present the maps developed from the American perspective first, followed by those maps created by the British and their allies. It is important to note that most of the maps touched upon in this discussion fall within the third category of period battle maps—those designed for a specific intention from a unique vantage point. None of them were developed prior to the event as part of the operational planning for the battle, and though a couple may have been conceived of for academic purposes as a form of studying the battle during that time period, there are unmistakable biases present in their execution.

9 Manœuvres of two Battalions of Artillery [map].
The American Maps

The primary base map, upon which the majority of the maps coming from the American perspective are derived from, is known as the Capitaine map, or, more properly, the Carte de l'Affaire de Montmouth: ou le G'al Washington Commandon l'Armée Américaine et le G'l Clinton l'Armée Angloise le 28 Juin 1778. At least two versions of this map exist, one that appears to be segmented and arranged vertically, the other appearing unsegmented and arrayed horizontally. The segmented version is most likely the original rendition, probably being drawn in segments while on the march following the battle and then, once completely drawn out, the segments were combined together and finished with commentary on the course of the battle. The other version of this map was potentially derived from the segmented version, however, having undergone minor alterations and additions of more formal stylization. Why are these maps known as “Capitaine” maps, who was Capitaine, and how did these maps become the basis for most American maps of the battle?

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These maps were created by Michel Capitaine du Chesnoy, a French geographical engineer who had served with the French Army as a lieutenant in the Regiment d’Aquitaine. French geographical engineers were a specialized force trained to serve with the advanced guard of the French army and were responsible for the finding, surveying, and mapping of routes that the army would take. These engineers were also tasked with the gathering of information on the local area in which military operations would take place.\textsuperscript{11} Capitaine came to America in early 1777 as part of Marie-Joseph Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de la Fayette’s entourage of French officers. By April of 1778, he was appointed a captain in the Continental Corps of Engineers by Congress and was initially assigned to map the Susquehanna River in Maryland and Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{12}

This Corps of Engineers, organized originally in 1775 under the leadership of chief engineer Colonel Richard Gridley with two assistant engineers, emerged as an important organization within the Continental Army as it fulfilled many of the engineering and cartographical needs cited by General Washington throughout this period; as is evident with the employment of Capitaine, the service also drew upon the expertise of foreign professionals to bolster its ranks.\textsuperscript{13} Upon completing his first assignment, Capitaine was reassigned as one of Major General Lafayette’s aides-de-camp with the chief role of mapping the battles in which Lafayette participated.\textsuperscript{14} Capitaine performed this specific duty while accompanying Lafayette during the Battle of Monmouth on June 28, 1778.

\textsuperscript{14} Capitaine du Chesnoy, “To Washington from Capitaine du Chesnoy, 4 October 1778,” Founders Online.
In a letter addressed to General Washington from October of 1778, Capitaine, at that time still serving as a captain, writes that “Gl de la Fayette had desired me to deliver in your hands the two inclosed draughts…but as I am sick I cannot do myself the honour therefore take the liberty to send them to you.” These “draughts,” or drafts, while not described in the note, potentially included a variant of the original, segmented version of the Capitaine map. Washington responded to Capitaine’s note, thanking him “for the elegant plans which accompanied it—they appear to me to be executed with great accuracy and military intelligence—and will have a place among the papers on which I set a value.”

Capitaine’s map depicts the battle entirely from the perspective of Lafayette. The terrain illustrated is most accurate along the paths directly taken and from the unique vantage points observed by the French general. This explains why the terrain on the map distorts the farther away one gets from the areas that Capitaine, alongside Lafayette, encountered. The information is presented because they were aware of these features; however, due to their lack of firsthand observation, their representation is nebulous on the map.

If one looks at the baseline Capitaine map, one can see the similarity between it and a linear route map. Consider the exercise of asking the average person to draw a map of their route from their home to their place of work and back again; the majority will draw that route in a linear format. As another example, for those who took road trips and visited their local AAA to plan it, they received a linear route from point A to point B in flip-book form, referred to as a “trip-tik.” The modern version of this would be the use of GPS or other electronic navigation systems, which, unless you physically zoom out, provides the route in a linear presentation. In the case of the Capitaine map, which puts point A as Englishtown at the bottom of the map and point B as Mont-

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15 Capitaine du Chesnoy, “To Washington from Capitaine du Chesnoy, 4 October 1778,” *Founders Online*. 
mouth (Monmouth) near the top, it is presented as being in a straight line, with everything along the path being in focus, and items on the periphery as becoming increasingly less so. Capitaine shows Continental infantry and artillery on what is shown as the extreme American right flank (Combs Hill) but does not show the position accurately; similarly, on the American left flank, completely floating in space is the position of an unidentified British unit. Conversely, the main American position on Perrine Hill and the main British position at the Hedgerow are depicted with far more accuracy, being two locations that Lafayette and Capitaine personally encountered. The flank positions were only those that they knew of or saw from a distance but had not actually encountered personally.

The unsegmented Capitaine map, 1778 (top), and the Brussels map, 1782 (bottom).\(^\text{16}\)

Whereas the primary purpose of this map drawn by Capitaine was to chronicle the route taken and some of the activities involving General Lafayette, it became the base for most of the other period maps from the American perspective. This map spawned a variety of other maps drawing from the information presented; some were created simply to clean up and better represent the base map for a variety of new intentions, while others were created working with the base by adding new information from additional sources. The first map developed from the base map was Capitaine’s second map. The first obvious difference is that the orientation of the map is changed from vertical to horizontal, and the corresponding descriptions are presented left to right as opposed to top to bottom. This map is later than the first as evidenced by the way it is signed. The first Capitaine map is signed by “Mr. Capitaine,” whereas this new version is signed by “Major Capitaine”; in November, 1778, Capitaine was breveted a major in Continental service, confirming that this map is of a later date.¹⁷

This later map was Capitaine’s refinement of the original into a more formalized “memorial map.” What is clear is that this particular map is far easier to follow for the nonmartial layman, especially in its horizontal orientation, its unsegmented nature, and in its simplified and more precise descriptions. While some aspects of this second map were cleaned up from the base, other elements were aggrandized. Although no additional features were added to this version of the map, the means in which those original features are presented are far richer. More ornamentations are

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added as well, providing a more formal air to the map, perhaps pointing to the intended audience for which this refined version of the Capitaine map was created for.

In January of 1779, Capitaine accompanied General Lafayette on his trip to France, during which Lafayette was received by King Louis XVI. Most likely during Lafayette’s time with the king, this more formal version of the map may have been presented to the French monarch and his court during their discussions of the progress of the war in America, implying that the intended use of this map was to help influence Louis in further support of the American cause. It is also interesting to note that during this visit Capitaine received the breveted rank of captain in the King’s Dragoons.  

The lineage of this “French” cadet branch of the Capitaine map continued on into a third cartographic generation with the Brussels map of 1782. This map, officially entitled Plan de la Bataille de Montmouth où le Gl. Washington Commandait l'Armée Américaine et le Gl. Clinton l'Armée Anglaise, le 28 Juin 1778 is not one of Capitaine’s original works but rather appeared in the French historian Michel-René Hilliard d’Auberteuil’s Essais Historiques et Politiques sur les Anglo-Américains, published in Brussels and Paris in 1782. The map itself appeared in Volume II of the work, which discussed the events of the American Revolutionary War from 1776 to the formation of the alliance between the United States and France. Presented in the traditional atlas format of the period, the map is depicted more simply; gone are the ornamentations and decorative features from the previous memorial style of the second Capitaine map.

The stress is on the readability of the map and text; the map is less cluttered and the text is easier to discern. Although the elements of the map and text follow very closely to the lineage of

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18 Capitaine du Chesnoy, “To Washington from Capitaine du Chesnoy, 4 October 1778,” Founders Online.
the Capitaine maps, the narrative of the text is presented in a more objective style, despite the fact that the illustrations of the map still hold true to the Lafayette/Capitaine perspective. Since neither of their names are referenced within the body of the map or text, the reader loses the context of the original source. Though this map may appear to be designed for an academic purpose, there was also an additional, latent intent to this map and these works as a whole. D’Auberteuil’s *Essais Historiques et Politiques*’ implied objective was to present the history of the American conflict and to justify France’s involvement. This was also one of the first major publications available in France toward the end of the American Revolution presenting a successful implementation of the Enlightenment ideals then in vogue; it is perhaps not too far a stretch to suggest that documents such as the *Essais* convinced influential Frenchmen in the ensuing years to follow political and social philosophies espoused during the American Revolution that would eventually bring about the French Revolution.\(^{20}\)

\[\text{The Library of Congress map, circa1778 (left) and the Sparks map, 1834 (right).}\(^{21}\)

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\(^{20}\) D’Auberteuil, “To Franklin from d’Auberteuil, 10 April 1782,” *Founders Online.*

While the French line of maps were developed, a separate lineage of maps, also descended from the Capitaine original illustration, arose in America. In keeping with the rustic nature of the young American republic, these domestic maps are simpler, less ornate than their “European brethren.” The above two maps, the Library of Congress map, circa 1778, and the Sparks map, 1834, representing the American branch of this family of maps, typify this modest style. Structurally, they borrow heavily from Capitaine’s first map; however, the information presented departs drastically from the original.

The first American map in this sequence is the circa 1778 map entitled *Battle of Monmouth* found in the Library of Congress’s collections. There is no known cartographer or draughtsman associated with this map. As with the French maps, this map’s orientation was also shifted horizontally for easier reading. The map relied heavily on Capitaine’s original terrain and unit placement; however, there are some additions, some subtle and some blatant, from other sources. The greatest departure in this map from Capitaine’s base map is the change in narrative and perspective. Whereas the Capitaine map followed the actions of Lafayette throughout the entire battle, this map concentrates on the actions of Major General Charles Lee during the morning and early afternoon of the Battle of Monmouth. In presenting that perspective, this map focuses primarily on Lee’s encounters with the enemy, and excludes, and in some cases truncates, unrelated information.

Based on the heavy focus on General Lee at Monmouth, it is highly probable that this map relies heavily on information found within General Lee’s court-martial; in fact, the map may even have accompanied a published version of the proceedings of the court-martial itself. Shortly after the engagement at Monmouth, Lee’s actions came under question, culminating in his court-martial. This trial took place within the immediate weeks following the conclusion of the battle. Called out
in particular on the map is an approximate location where Washington encountered Lee during the retreat. There is more emphasis on Lee’s routes, both for his attack and his retreat, which includes the shrinking of areas between the village of Monmouth Courthouse and the areas of the main fighting in the late morning and early afternoon. Also of note is the increased prominence of the Carr House and the hedged fence on this map, both features key to Lee’s retreat; these features are present in the Capitaine map, but they are not labeled and do not bear any major significance. Another departure between the Capitaine map and this later map is in the narrative; features are now labeled specifically based on Washington’s and Lee’s actions, while reference to any other actor, including Lafayette, have been erased. It should also be noted that while some items were removed, other features were added, showing knowledge that Capitaine did not have of the American position on the British left flank; specifically, the area of Combs Hill is more fully realized, both in its topography and its more accurate portrayal of the American infantry and artillery at that location.

The second map referenced in this American series has the advantage of hindsight as it was created nearly 50 years after the end of the war. Found in Volume V of Jared Sparks’s *The Writings of George Washington*, this map, also entitled *Battle of Monmouth, June 28th, 1778* was published in 1834. Although still a descendent of the Capitaine map in structure and form, this map draws upon the unique resources researched domestically and abroad by Jared Sparks, a significant biographer of George Washington at that time. Both the illustrations and the map’s narrative are heavily reliant on the Library of Congress map; however, additional information depicted on the map and in the narrative suggest that while abroad, Sparks encountered the maps of the French Capitaine line as well as some of the British maps on the battle. There is the addition of American unit commanders’ names for the advance corps as well as the two wings of the main army.
Additional information on British positions and road names appear to have come from British sources.

While Sparks may originally have envisioned this map as a purely academic map to accompany the other published documents of Washington, from the perspective of this study, it still falls into the third map category as the Sparks map portrays a Washington-centric interpretation. The very fact that it is situated within a series of volumes on Washington indicates that Sparks meant to use this map to support the actions and decisions taken by Washington as a military leader during the Revolutionary War. The presentation reinforces Washington’s taking command of the situation at Monmouth, turning the tide of battle, an intention which by nature takes it out of the realm of academic maps.

The Butler map, circa 1778.22

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In ending the discussion on the American maps, it is worth noting one map that stands out from the other maps in this grouping, one that exists outside of the Capitaine family of maps. This map, referred to as the Butler map but properly entitled *Plan of the Battle of Monmouth, 28th of June, 1778*, attributed to Captain William Gray of the Fourth Pennsylvania Regiment as the map’s creator, was sketched shortly after the Battle of Monmouth. The Butler map follows the activities of then Colonel Richard Butler during the course of the battle. Butler was the commander of the Ninth Pennsylvania Regiment, of the Third Pennsylvania Brigade within the Continental Army and was chosen at the start of the campaign to command one of the battalions of “picked men” assigned to a detachment under the command of Brigadier General Charles Scott. This detachment formed a part of the extreme left portion of Major General Charles Lee’s pincer attack against the British rearguard north of the village of Monmouth Courthouse. When the British counterattacked, Scott’s detachment did not rejoin the rest of Lee’s command, but rather took a separate, more northerly route back to the main body of Washington’s army.\(^{23}\)

The details of the map, besides following Butler at Monmouth, also present unique elements when compared to the other American maps within this study group. One of the most obvious departures is the inclusion of additional, highly accurate features beyond the scope of these other maps. The base of this map appears to have been derived from a detailed survey map of the area, including natural landforms and manmade features such as rivers, streams, wooded areas, orchards, and structures. These elements are far more inclusive than the other American

maps, and as will be seen later more so than most of the British maps, identifying many more of
the local landowners as well as the buildings burnt by the British in the days prior to the beginning
of the battle. Even though the information presented on the map all appears to be written in the
same hand, the material directly related to Butler appears to be superimposed upon the baseline
survey data.

This map would still be considered an example of maps informed by a unique perspective,
in this case, being Butler-centric. Reports of Butler’s actions in the morning portions of the battle
are well-documented, especially as found in the court-martial of General Lee.24 Those details are
corroborated on the Butler map; however, additional information presented on this sketch reveals
other possible areas of fighting at Monmouth in which Butler may have participated. It infers that
upon rejoining the main army on Perrine Hill, Butler resumed command of the Ninth Pennsylvania
Regiment, and, later that afternoon, participated in fighting at the parsonage farm under the
direction of Brigadier General Anthony Wayne. Despite these details, there are many unanswered
questions surrounding this map due to its lack of context.

The Butler map comes from a collection of papers of Richard Butler, which was given to his
biographer and editor, Neville B. Craig, by Butler’s son, Captain James Butler, in the early
nineteenth century. The papers were later passed on to the Draper Collection of the Wisconsin
Historical Society, whereas the map was given to the New-York Historical Society by Craig’s
daughter following his death in 1863, separating the sketch from the context of Butler’s original
papers at that point. It is uncertain what the true purpose behind the map was; however, what still

24 “Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Held at Brunswick, in the State of New Jersey, by Order of His Excellency
General Washington, Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States, for the Trial of Major General Lee, July
4th, 1778, Major General Lord Stirling, President,” in Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year
remains clear is that it shows the positions that Butler was engaged in, to the exclusion of some of the other fighting elements on both sides of the battle. Only those units directly related to Butler, those that provided some sort of support for Butler’s forces, or those directly opposed to Butler’s men are depicted, cementing the proposition that this map’s perspective is firmly set on Richard Butler.²⁵

The British Maps

Beginning the discussion on British maps from the period of the Battle of Monmouth, it is interesting to note that there is a broader range of maps and sketches available. This is largely due to the presence of trained draftsmen with the British Army and their allies during the Revolutionary War in general and, specifically, on the march to New York. The British military was aware of the advantages of using cartography as an element in the planning for operations. Due to the perceived importance of military maps, the British had a system in place for training professional engineers in mapmaking while also identifying and utilizing skilled amateurs to serve in this capacity.

²⁶ John Hills, Sketch of Part of the Road From Freehold to Middle Town Shewing the Skirmish Between the Rear of the British Army Under the Command of His Excellency Genl. Sir Henry Clinton and the Advanced Corps of the Rebel Army June 28th 1778, [map] 1778, University of Michigan Library Digital Collections, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wcl11ic/x-8384/wcl008455; John Hills and Sir Henry Clinton, Sketch of Part of the Road
To initiate this analysis on the British maps of Monmouth, it is best to consult the works of the most prolific British mapmaker for the battle, John Hills. The two maps shown above are just a small sampling of the extent of his work on Monmouth; at least four of his maps related to the battle were consulted as part of the research for this paper. In reviewing his maps, there is definitely a progression in refinement of style present in the variants. As illustrated above, the second map depicts the same terrain as the first; however it has more details and additional information, giving the impression of it being a more completed piece. This progression in refinement is unique in that while other cartographers most likely used similar methods, more of Hills’s works are extant and are readily available to researchers. So what was this British system that produced cartographers for the army and how does John Hills fit in with this system?

The British Corps of Engineers, a service separate from the British Army, administered under the Board of Ordnance (the same organization that administered the Royal Artillery), was tasked with the conducting of sieges, building and maintaining fortifications, building roads, supervising laborers, and providing sketches and maps for construction modifications and operational planning during military campaigns. Cadets were taught the fundamentals of engineering, cartography, and draftsmanship by members of the board at such establishments as the Tower of London’s Drawing Room and the Royal Artillery’s Woolwich Academy. Once graduated and placed within the Corps, engineers were classified by experience, and an accompanying army rank matched the title; as of 1757, “practitioner engineers” were equivalent to subalterns, “sub-engineers” were given the rank of lieutenants, “engineers extraordinary” were given the rank of captain-lieutenants, and “engineers in ordinary” were listed as captains.

Frequently, British engineers held regimental positions in addition to their engineer grades. Engineers were sent in detachments to different theaters of operations and were placed under the overall administration and direction of a “chief engineer” for that locale, the Board of Ordnance’s representative in engineering matters and the chief engineering consultant to the local army commander-in-chief. In the case of the British Army in North America during the American Revolutionary War, these responsibilities fell to Captain John Montresor as chief engineer.27

Outside of the official structure of the Corps of Engineers, there existed an ad hoc system of bringing in talented volunteers and competent regular army officers into the local engineering establishment and assigning them duties as “assistant engineers.” Due to the limited numbers of official engineers available from the Corps, there were far more of these assistant engineers employed by the British Army in North America during the Revolutionary War; military commanders began to depend heavily on these “amateur” engineers for their cartographic skills in operational planning and for documenting the exploits of the army while on campaign.28

It is from within this fresh crop of talented assistant engineers that John Hills emerged. John Hills began his service as a “volunteer” in the 38th Regiment of Foot prior to being commissioned in the same regiment as an ensign in July of 1778. It appears that Hills began his extracurricular activities of serving as a draughtsman at this time, as his maps on Monmouth emerged roughly around the same period. He is later listed as an “extra draughtsman” (essentially serving as an assistant engineer on cartographic assignments) on Chief Engineer Montresor’s staff in September, 1778; he transferred one month later to the Royal Artillery, and later, to the 23rd

Regiment of Foot (the Royal Welsh Fusiliers) in both services as a second lieutenant, all the while still executing the functions and duties of an assistant engineer in the British army until 1784.29

There are some questions concerning John Hills’s direct involvement with the Battle of Monmouth. The line companies of the regiment that he was attached to as a volunteer, the 38th Regiment, were not present with the British army at Monmouth, being likely stationed with other British forces occupying New York at the time (it is documented that only the grenadier and light infantry companies of this regiment were present for the battle). This then leaves the question of where Hills was during the battle—was he on detached service from his regiment, already serving on Montresor’s staff and therefore present at the battle, or was he indeed with his regiment in New York and only received information regarding the battle after its conclusion? Regardless of his actual location, the maps imply that Hills obtained highly detailed information regarding the terrain, the participants, and other pertinent facets of the battle. The maps show the route taken by the British through the area, while peripherally portraying the battle as a “skirmish.”

The most obvious difference with the Hills maps and most of the American maps of the battle is the knowledge of the terrain. The British spent significantly more time in the area before and during the battle, providing the opportunity to obtain more intimate familiarity of the vicinity surrounding the town of Freehold, a fact that makes itself felt not only in the Hills maps but across all the British maps in general depicting the events of the battle. This familiarity is in contrast to that of the Americans, which was limited to areas directly in conflict at the time of the battle. The areas held and traversed by the British are more accurately depicted in these maps; however, as with the American maps, areas outside their direct experience fall short in their accuracy. Due to the nature of the objective of the British army, in traversing New Jersey to arrive at Sandy Hook

through Middletown, transportation routes via roads are more accurately portrayed and identified. This is a common thread found in all the British maps of the battle; however, it is more evident in Hills’s maps due to the prolific nature of his work.

Looking at Hills’s series of maps and sketches on Monmouth, the purpose is to chronicle the larger operation of troop movement from Philadelphia to New York, denoting significant features and events along the route. The military action at Monmouth is an important feature of the series to be sure, but is not by far the only one; included in all these examples are the preeminence of the roads and geographical features of the route taken by the British army across New Jersey, including another significant junction encountered by the British at Middletown. This may explain why Monmouth is presented as a skirmish, emphasizing that the primary purpose is troop movement, and that the engagement was of a secondary status. The primary goal of the British Army in this instance was to traverse New Jersey intact in order to arrive at its safe haven at Sandy Hook before sailing on to New York; this the British did do successfully, a note that Hills and other British cartographers of the time emphasized in their works. In fact, Clinton was under direct orders to extract his troops from Philadelphia for consolidation in New York; the intention of these maps were to show how this was achieved, stressing the route taken, rather than moments of conflict.  

This British perception also downplays the importance that the Americans place upon the events at Monmouth Courthouse in the immediate aftermath of the fighting, as it is only much later that the British begin to refer to Monmouth as a “battle” in the years following the conclusion of the American Revolutionary War.

The next two British maps are examples of works from other members of the British engineers, both of whom operated in a similar capacity as that of John Hills. The first of these engineers was Lieutenant George Walker Dyall Jones, who served as an officer in the Seventh Regiment of Foot, Royal Fusiliers, and as an assistant engineer in the British Army in North America during the war. The second cartographer is Captain Archibald Robertson, British Corps of Engineers, who had been on assignment with the British Army in North America since 1775.32

Despite coming to this field from differing backgrounds, one an infantry officer serving in a special, ad hoc capacity, and the other a professional engineer and cartographer, both Jones and Robertson operated in very much the same manner as John Hills and applied similar intentions toward their own maps on Monmouth. Like Hills, both focused their maps on chronicling the actions of the British during their crossing of New Jersey. While Hills focused on the routes taken

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during this movement, Jones, whose very own Royal Fusiliers remained in reserve in the village of Monmouth Courthouse, while showing the main artillery engagements, primarily documents the position of certain British and Hessian units in their after-action disposition. The fact that Jones’s regiment was stationed in town centers his perspective on the positions and main features in and immediately around Freehold proper, while, like a fish-eye lens, the features and activities outside of town, especially the main portion of the fighting in the afternoon, are less clearly defined.

Robertson, who may not even have been present for the battle, being possibly with the British forces in New York, used secondhand information to produce a self-described “rough sketch” of the immediate roadways around Freehold, the important areas of fighting on the day in question, as well as encampment positions on the days leading up to the fighting. The fact that his information is secondhand, gathered potentially from various sources, and placed upon this rough sketch as part of his process for developing more refined maps, implies that the accuracy of this map, in terms of specific features, especially those related to the terrain of the battlefield, by its very nature is diminished. What these maps have in common is the shared intent of showing the placement and actions of individual units, demonstrating to those who might view their maps that while yes, this action was only considered at the time to be a skirmish and part of a greater mission to move the British back to New York, the forces engaged at Monmouth still conducted themselves in proper British military form.
Along with the British engineers tasked with chronicling through maps the campaigns of the war, their Hessian allies also had their own counterparts charged with the same duties. Directly on the staff of the ranking Hessian officer, Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, were two engineers, one of which was Captain Reinhard Jacob Martin who created a map of the battle entitled *Affaire de Monmouth ce 28me Juin 1778*. Martin was a member of the Hesse-Kassel Corps of Engineers; as is seen with other European military establishments, many of the German states, Hesse-Kassel being a significant example, included an engineering corps in which its members utilized cartographic skills in planning and documenting military operations. He came over with the Hessian auxiliary forces at the beginning of the war as a lieutenant, and was appointed the Hessians’ deputy quartermaster in January of 1776; he was promoted to captain shortly thereafter.

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33 Reinhard Jacob Martin, *Affaire de Monmouth ce 28me Juin 1778*, [map] 1779, University of Michigan Library Digital Collections, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wcl1ic/x-8411/WCL008482?auth=world;lasttype=boolean;lastview=reslist;resnum=8463;size=50;sort=none;start=8451;view=entry;rgn1=ic_all;q1=wcl1ic.
Upon Knyphausen’s assumption of command of Hessian troops in 1777, Martin retained his staff officer duties while continuing to operate as an engineer and cartographer for the British and Hessian allied forces until his death in 1780.34

Martin’s map was drawn one year after the battle while the British were occupying New York and was created as a memorial map to document all the units involved in the “affair at Monmouth.” It details the location of the encampments of British and Hessian forces prior to the battle, and proceeds to concentrate in-depth on Lieutenant-General Cornwallis’s division as it marched from town and how it deployed once the fighting began. Similar to the Jones map, the area that Martin was most familiar with, being on Knyphausen’s staff, are the areas in and around Freehold and the routes in and out of town. Information on the deployment of units engaged in the fighting was gathered after the fact and was placed upon a map whose terrain features outside of town become increasingly nebulous and distorted due to his lack of familiarity with the geography.

This map was intended to document where the troops encamped before the battle, to illustrate the proper execution of the march, and to show the re-deployment of both British and Hessian troops in response to an American attack in force. Martin uses his map to not only downplay the fighting as simply a skirmish and not a battle (in keeping with the earliest British conceptions of what occurred at Monmouth), but to highlight the coordinated actions of allied forces during the campaign. This over-all depiction, an excellent example of a memorial map, being a formal, finished map meant to commemorate a battle, likely found positive favor with allied leadership overseas in both Great Britain and the German principalities.

The first Clinton map, (left) and second Clinton map, (right), created 1778–1795.\textsuperscript{35}

The next series of British maps come directly from the collections of the British commander at the Battle of Monmouth, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton. As William B. Willcox, the editor of the published account of Clinton’s time during the Revolutionary War, states, “he [Clinton] spent the remaining twelve years of his life in composing the narrative . . . written to redeem his military reputation at the cost of others.”\textsuperscript{36} Clinton died before his manuscript was ready for the printer, his papers and maps laying in obscurity with family members until William L. Clements purchased the collection in 1925, later depositing the material in the Clements Library of the University of Michigan. Willcox later edited and finally published the Clinton manuscript in 1954, entitled \textit{The American Rebellion}, and chose not to include the above maps in the printing.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} Sir Henry Clinton, \textit{Battle of Monmouth, 28th June 1778}, [map] 1778–1795, University of Michigan Library Digital Collections, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wcl1ic/x-872/WCL000966?lasttype=boolean;lastview=reslist;resnum=5;size=50;sort=relevance;start=1;subview=detail;view=entry;rgn1=wcl1ic_su;select1=phrase;q1=Clinton%2520Maps;Sir Henry Clinton, \textit{Battle of Monmouth, 28th June 1778}, [map] 1778–1795, University of Michigan Library Digital Collections, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wcl1ic/x-752/WCL000865?lasttype=boolean;lastview=reslist;resnum=6;size=50;sort=relevance;start=1;subview=detail;view=entry;rgn1=wcl1ic_su;select1=phrase;q1=Clinton%2520Maps.

\textsuperscript{36} Clinton, \textit{The American Rebellion}, ix–x.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., x.
In many ways, the Clinton maps are very similar to the Sparks map, having the advantage of hindsight in the creation of these maps. In creating these maps in the postwar years, Clinton had access to a number of other maps and perspectives, including the many American, British, and Hessian examples already discussed, in order to develop these depictions. In fact, the former British commander even had access to the Lee court-martial in order to infuse additional American points of view into his narrative. The terrain seems to borrow heavily from the earlier British and Hessian maps, appearing to be more accurate in the areas where he would have had firsthand knowledge on account of the encampments, marching routes, and the actions on the day of fighting. Included in this are the placement of his own troops on the maps. Because of his access to other sources, even the terrain details of areas outside his direct knowledge seem to be more accurately depicted. It is only in the areas on his maps that are both outside his perspective and the perspective of the other relied-upon map sources where that accuracy fails, often represented by largely white, vacant areas or depictions of creeks that run off to the borders of the maps themselves. It is possible that, for Clinton, as nothing of value to his narrative would have occurred in those areas, he would have had no issue in keeping these irrelevant areas off of his maps entirely. It is also interesting to note that one map appears to be a slightly earlier version of the map and has positions, features, and commentaries that are later refined or corrected in the second, later version, providing additional context for his work-in-progress manuscript of touching on his forces’ exploits during the Monmouth campaign.

It is most interesting to note that both of his maps incorporates the term “battle” in their titles, a significant departure from the various other phrases used to describe and name the fighting in less important terms. As has been noted, most British maps used the terms “skirmish;” to use “battle” seems to indicate that, in Clinton’s postwar mind, the actions at Monmouth took on
increasing importance. By acknowledging the significance of Monmouth, Clinton attempted to better justify his forces’ actions during its march through New Jersey.

It is clear from Clinton’s desire to clarify as well as elevate what happened at Monmouth that he had a specific intent in mind. The fact that these maps were found along with his manuscript clearly shows his intent to justify himself at every turn against his detractors in the years following the American Revolutionary War. The University of Michigan’s Clements Library introduction on the Clinton Papers relates:

The key to the origin of the Clinton Collection lies in the egotistical and self-doubting dichotomy of Sir Henry Clinton’s personality. Clinton exhibited an almost maniacal fascination with the duplication of any and all correspondence that he wrote and received . . . Clinton accumulated a huge collection of letters, maps and ephemera related to the British Army Headquarters. Clinton originally amassed this large collection in order to defend any possible repercussions of his military decisions. His deep distrust of his comrades and his paranoid personality led him to stockpile the British Army papers against the chance of political repercussions for any of his actions.

Following the war and his return to England, with his being made a scapegoat for the British defeat and loss of America, Clinton felt the need to reclaim his name and reputation. Since many, if not most, of the other returning command-level officers from the same theater had already achieved this feat, it convinced him of the need to marshal his collections of records and maps, including the referenced maps on Monmouth, to combat his infamy. While ultimately not successful due to his untimely death in 1795, the Clinton maps nonetheless fit perfectly in the third category of maps within this study due to Clinton’s very specific intentions behind their creation.

Similar to the unique qualities found with the Butler map in the American collection, the above map by John André provides an interesting take within the British perspective. André, who would later become linked to one of the most infamous affairs in the American Revolutionary War—the defection of American general Benedict Arnold to the British side—at the time of the Battle of Monmouth was a captain in the 26th Regiment of Foot and was serving as the aide-de-camp to Major-General Sir Charles Grey. André maintained a personal journal from June 11, 1777, to November 15, 1778, in which he recorded his private impressions of events of interest, including a narrative of the march from Philadelphia to New York, punctuated by key events exemplified by the Battle of Monmouth. In conjunction with this continuing narrative, André sketched a series of maps detailing these events, and one map in particular presented the main actions of the battle.

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itself. It is important to note that André had no known formal engineering or cartographic training and was not employed in the British army, in any capacity, as such.⁴¹

What is apparent, however, is that John André possessed an eye for detail and utilized an artistic approach in the creation of his sketch maps throughout the journal. In looking at his map on Monmouth, the first point of interest is in his title, *Battle of Monmouth, 28 June 1778*, clearly relating his impression that the actions at Monmouth were more significant than a skirmish. When you begin to look at the details of the map itself, his use of shadows gives a fairly accurate impression of the terrain. Information placed on his sketch includes encampments prior to the fighting, deployments on the march, and the disposition of forces on the day of battle. As we have seen in every other map in this study, the accuracy of these placements and the terrain is greatest based on André’s position on the battlefield. The epicenter of his perspective seems to radiate from the mid-field position near to what other maps have labeled as the Carr, or Ker, House. This would imply that André was likely positioned with the British Fourth Brigade, which most sources agree was placed near the Carr House during the battle; this unit was one of two brigades under the direct command of André’s superior, Major-General Grey. All actions beyond this point are hinted at, but not fully developed, suggesting his lack of direct involvement.

As is every other facet surrounding this map on Monmouth, André’s intentions in making this map are especially unique when compared with almost every other map in this study. Due to the fact that this map is an insert in his private journal, a work not normally developed for public consumption, André primarily drew this map for his own use and to potentially support his or his acquaintances’ actions should anything be called into question. In keeping with this interpretation, André would attempt to be as accurate as possible based on the information and sources he had on

⁴¹ André, *Battle of Freehold*, [map].
hand, both in his journal entries and his maps. By its very nature, then, this would also put this map into the third category of period maps, one derived out of a unique or special intention.

Summary and Conclusions

In bringing this study to a close, it is best to recall the thesis that period maps are subjective manifestations of events from the past, not objective, omnipotent, observations. In establishing a methodical approach to initiate an analysis of period maps, the first step is to qualify which type of map each document is. It is generally observed that period maps can fall into multiple categories indicating their purpose and usage. The maps analyzed in the course of this study all fit well within one of the categories initially proposed at the onset of this survey, that of maps created out of a specific intention from a unique vantage point. None of the maps surveyed appear to be operational maps, while two of the maps exhibit characteristics of academic maps while still interpreted as being derived from a unique intention outside of academia. A true academic map would not have their biases peek through, and, in both of these instances, that is not the case; these maps are too close to the subject and their biases are evident when taken into context. The first true academic map of the Battle of Monmouth, in the opinion of this study, would not come for over one hundred years following the battle until the 1881 map *The Battle of Monmouth* was published in Henry B. Carrington’s *The Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution*; however, even with this example, there is a latent, underlying intention by Carrington to illustrate the value in these battle maps to influence the public on the importance of the study of military science to train future leaders in the lessons of the past.42

Bearing these categorical distinctions in mind, and by following the themes identified throughout this survey, one can discern some best-practice techniques when using period maps as

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part of one’s own study and research of the past. A researcher, when conducting their own analysis of period maps, should keep in mind the creator and/or commissioner of the map, the perspective from which they are observing, the target audience of the map, the intent behind the presentation of the document, and the ultimate usage of the map. By looking at the creator or commissioner of the map, one can more readily infer the purpose and intent behind the document. For example, recall the Clinton maps, in which Sir Henry Clinton commissioned and/or possibly drew these maps as a means to support and defend his wartime actions following the war. One should pay attention to the individual perspective presented in the map. The Capitaine maps are a perfect illustration of an individual’s perspective on the battlefield, because the elements as presented on the map are clearer from firsthand observation and participation, whereas the clarity diminishes the further out from the individual, the information of which becomes more questionable in its accuracy to the researcher.

The next element that needs to be taken into account is the audience initially targeted by the map. An excellent representation of this can be found in the “Brussels maps,” which were initially published as part of a history of the events of the American Revolution for the people of France and Europe in general as the events were still ongoing. A good researcher should endeavor to ascertain the initial intent behind the presentation of the map. Recall, for example, the Library of Congress map, probably intended to complement and illustrate the key points from the testimony given as part of the court-martial of Major General Charles Lee immediately after the battle. Finally, one should be aware of the ultimate usage of the map by its contemporaries. A perfect example of this can be seen in the Martin map, which memorializes the battle and the actions taken by all parties, and is ultimately used to illustrate and strengthen the military alliance
between Great Britain and the Hessian states by depicting the coordinated efforts of the joint forces.

As presented by these points, and the discussion highlighted throughout this paper, period maps should not be taken at face value. A dedicated researcher must always keep in mind the underlying pitfalls in removing the human element when considering these maps and sketches. One must use period maps just as any other primary documentary source; focusing on any one account taken out of the context of all the accounts can skew the research and lead to errant interpretations. When taken as part of a whole, objectively, a fuller picture of the event in question can be seen. As presented in the collection of maps in this study, any one of the maps taken alone would throw a bias on the understanding of the course of the Battle of Monmouth; taking that same map, and seeing how it intersects with the other primary accounts of the battle, gives one a clearer overall picture of the whole affair. If the reader and researcher takes nothing else away from this study, it is simply this: to not judge a map just by its folio.

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