Artillery Supported by Infantry:

The Royal Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse

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This paper analyzes three questions concerning the Royal Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse: how many artillery pieces were used during the battle, which units were employed, and what role the Royal Artillery played in relationship to its parent organizations, the British Army and the British Board of Ordnance. Each of these topics have been seldom discussed, especially in connection to the narrative of the Battle of Monmouth. It is hoped that these inquiries can provide some clarity on the Royal Artillery’s part in the battle, and might spark new efforts of research by future scholars of the American Revolutionary War.

In examining these points, careful attention was made in discussing the overall structure of the Royal Artillery and offering a comparison/contrast with its opponent: the Continental Artillery. The main primary source consulted in this discussion was the official Papers of Brigadier-General James Pattison, commander of Royal Artillery forces in North America. These research endeavors resulted in a concrete number of guns used during the Monmouth campaign, some strong indications for the particular units employed, as well as some new insights concerning the traditional interpretation of the battle that may require future analysis.

Introduction

This paper is the second installment of a series discussing the role of the artillery at the American Revolutionary War Battle of Monmouth Courthouse (June 28, 1778), alternatively known as the Battle of Monmouth. The goal of this piece is to do many of the same things as in
the first\(^1\); this discussion, however, examines the organization and composition of the Royal Artillery engaged as part of the British Army at the battle. Just as with Continental artillery forces, information surrounding the role and identification of elements of the Royal Artillery is obscured by a lack of clarity in the sources and a want of research on the subject. This article endeavors to shed some light on this topic, and, as the other installments of this series also aimed to do, initiate new research on a seldom discussed subject of a battle that is touted as the largest field artillery battle of the American Revolutionary War.

Unlike the Continental Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth, which had one distinct set of units that fought during the morning portion of the battle and yet another completely different set of forces operating during the afternoon phases, only one group of British artillery units were ever engaged throughout the entire battle. Despite this difference, when looking at the Royal Artillery, the same questions arise as in an analysis of the Continental Artillery – how many guns were involved, which units exactly were employed, and what role did the artillery fill in relationship to its parent army?

To answer these questions, one should first look at what the most commonly used sources have said on the subject. This is a relatively short exercise since there has not been extensive research done on the artillery of this battle from the British perspective. More concrete answers lie in the primary sources which this analysis will concentrate on for this examination of the subject.

This article will also address the organization of the Royal Artillery and the role that it played in relationship to the British Army, both of which were distinctly different in some key ways than the operational model employed by the Continental Artillery designed and implemented

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by American Brigadier General Henry Knox. Much of this difference in operational execution is thanks in large part to the role played by both the British Board of Ordnance and Brigadier-General James Pattison, the British senior artillerist at the time of the battle in North America. By looking at these different factors (the number of artillery pieces used by the British in the battle, which units might have been employed, and the methods of deployment for these units), insight can be gained on this key element of the battle.

**Structure of the Royal Artillery**

The best way to understand the Royal Artillery is by looking at its structure and organization and comparing it to the model used by Continental forces during the Revolutionary War. The Royal Artillery was unique in that it did not actually exist as part of the British Army; instead, it was controlled under an entirely separate service in the British government known as the Board of Ordnance. In his work *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution*, Edward E. Curtis describes the Board of Ordnance as:

> Amphibious in character, pertaining to both the army and the navy. It had charge of arms, ammunition, ordnance, tents, bedding, wagons, the erection of barracks, fortifications, hospitals, and magazines. It provided military prisons, regulated the inspection of arms and accoutrements, was charged with the repair of the royal observatory at Greenwich and the preparation of maps for military purposes. It enjoyed complete control, even to the exclusion of the secretary at war, over artillery, engineers, sappers, pontoonists, and artificers...it should be added that Woolwich Military Academy...also came within the province of the office of ordnance.²

This service supplied stores and materiel to both the British Army and the Royal Navy, neither of which could issue orders to the Board for its needs. It only acted in military affairs upon a warrant from the king, the Privy Council, secretaries of state, or the Board of Admiralty, a privilege that the Board of Ordnance leadership maintained with fierce jealousy. The Board itself was headed

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by the Master-General of Ordnance, the sole issuer of orders for the Board. From 1772 to 1782, this position was held by Viscount George Townshend. He was supported on the Board by the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, the Surveyor General, the Clerk of the Ordnance, the Storekeeper, the Clerk of the Deliveries, and the Treasurer & Paymaster.3

Most important to this discussion, however, was the fact that during the American Revolutionary War, the Board of Ordnance was the parent organization and commanding body for the Royal Regiment of Artillery. By the beginning of the war, the Royal Artillery was organized into one regiment of 2,256 artillerymen and was technically under the command of the Master-General of the Ordnance. It was divided up into four battalions, each headed by a colonel, with a lieutenant colonel and a major. An artillery battalion, in turn, was broken up into eight companies; the company was commanded by a captain, and had amongst its other officers one captain lieutenant, one first lieutenant, and two to three second lieutenants. Each company also included four sergeants, four corporals, nine bombardiers, eighteen gunners, 73 matrosses, and two drummers. This brought the full operational strength of each company, including officers and enlisted, to 116 men. The company served as the lowest administrative level for the Royal Artillery during the Revolutionary War; it was at this level, and not typically at the battalion level, that individual units were sent from Great Britain to serve in the fighting in North America.4 This organizational system is illustrated in the following chart:

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3 Curtis, The Organization of the British Army in the Revolution, 40-44.
The British Army typically employed the Royal Artillery in different arrangements that best suited the tactical situation it encountered. The companies sent to a particular station or theater of war would be “brigaded,” or combined together, despite the possibility of coming from different battalions into a single “Brigade of Artillery” at that location. These brigades usually existed only for the duration of a conflict, or if orders from Great Britain forced its break-up due to redeployment of forces to other stations of service. As was the case with the Brigade of Artillery with the British forces in North America, the brigade would be commanded by one of the senior field officers in the Royal Artillery, typically one of the battalion colonels, who would often be given the local rank of brigadier-general. This officer also served as the chief of artillery for the British army serving at that station.  

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6 Duncan, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 306.
For deployment in the field, traditional practices favored the assignment of a two-gun “detachment” of artillery from a particular company to each infantry regiment, often referred to as “battalion guns.” These deployments were temporary, usually lasting for a single campaign season; they were commanded by one of the company’s lieutenants, with each of the gun crews being led by a sergeant or corporal. The men that formed these detachments all hailed from the same company, and upon completion of their assignment, would return to the company’s overall command. During their assignment, the men of the battalion guns marched, fought, and camped with the infantry regiment that they were connected to. Battalion guns were either three-pounders (usually reserved for light infantry) or, more commonly, six-pounders, the true work horses of the Royal Artillery.\(^7\)

The usage of battalion guns proved disadvantageous for British commanders during the Revolutionary War, however, as this arrangement often prevented the amassing of larger collections of guns for concentrated fire against enemy positions. To overcome this, British commanders in North America adopted, in many variations, the concept of the “brigade guns.” This model assigned two detachments to a single infantry brigade, all under the over-all command of a captain or captain lieutenant, giving this brigade the combined power of four six-pounders of artillery. The two subordinate detachments were often detailed out from different companies, and the captain also typically hailed from a different company than the men he was commanding.\(^8\)

Just as in the model of battalion guns, the artillerists of the brigade guns only served temporarily in this capacity, for a season or a campaign, and then would revert to their normal company commands at the end of their assignment. The use of brigade guns did not exclude the

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usage of battalion guns during this period; the British Army at Monmouth, for example, used both arrangements – battalion guns for stronger, elite forces (such as grenadier, guard, and light infantry battalions), while each of the five brigades, comprised solely of regiments of foot (line battalions), had assignments of brigade guns.\(^9\)

When not siphoned off for duty as battalion or brigade guns, the Royal Artillery forces of a given British army in the field were attached to a large reserve force known as the Artillery Park. This term also describes the area within a military encampment were the artillery and artillerists resided. The men and artillery pieces of the Park served multiple roles. They were a ready reserve force, in that they could field additional detachments of three-pounders and six-pounders into to the field as needed. The Park also maintained the heavier artillery pieces, twelve-pounders, twenty four-pounders, as well as mortars and howitzers; these would be used in siege and bombardment actions, as well as in situations which called for the use of heavier concentrated artillery fire, such as was utilized during the “Great Cannonade” in the afternoon phases of the Battle of Monmouth.\(^{10}\)

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\(^9\) Pattison, Disposition of Officers and Men, December 1, 1777, *The Pattison Papers*.

Comparison of Continental and British Artillery Organizational Models

The organizational and operational structure of the Royal Artillery is important not only for the insight gained in understanding how these forces were used in the Monmouth campaign but also how it influenced the formation and implementation of the Continental Artillery. The commander of the American artillery, Brigadier General Henry Knox, was familiar with European models of organizing and deploying artillery in his amateur studies of foreign military forces. However, in developing the Continental Brigade of Artillery, the primary model that influenced him was the establishment that he was most familiar with – the Royal Regiment of Artillery. Despite differences in nomenclature, he loosely organized his command along parallel lines with the British: Knox’s Brigade had four regiments (often referred to interchangeably as battalions),
which matched the four battalions of the Royal Artillery Regiment. The main administrative unit of each of these battalions, both British as well as Continental, was the company.\(^{11}\)

This, however, was where the similarities ended, due in large part to the realities of the Revolutionary War and differences between the two services. The first apparent difference lies in how each artillery establishment is situated within their respective military force. In the British model, the Royal Artillery Regiment existed completely separate from the British Army as its own military service, answerable, as was mentioned before, to the Board of Ordnance, and only doled out for use in conjunction with the British Army at the orders and often at the whims of the Board and its Master-General of the Ordnance. The Continental Artillery, however, existed as a branch of the Continental Army itself, and not some separate service operating in cooperation with the rest of the army.

Secondly, the British Chief of Artillery assigned to each station, in this case North America with the British Army under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, also served as the main liaison between that army and the Board of Ordnance. All requests for materiel, its transportation, as well as all artillery matters, were organized and directed by this Royal Artillery officer, who acted in this capacity as a quartermaster general for his army as well as senior artillerist. This differed once again with the Continental model; the Brigade of Artillery and the Quartermaster Corps were separate branches, each with its own commander, both of whom were directly answerable to the Continental Army’s Commander-in-Chief, General George Washington.\(^{12}\)

There were some significant differences that existed as well at the operational level. While both services maintained the artillery company as its primary administrative level, the size and


usage of the company differed greatly in both Continental and British establishments. The size of a Continental artillery company varied, averaging approximately 30 officers and men, in effect, making it more on par with a Royal Artillery detachment rather than one of their companies. Due to this design, these companies were assigned to infantry forces as one cohesive unit, unlike the British, who broke up their artillery companies into detachments for various assignments.\textsuperscript{13}

Finally, the types of deployment methods employed by both services were different. The companies of the Continental Artillery, when not operating in the Park, were assigned to infantry brigades as brigade guns only, as opposed to the British model of assigning brigade guns as well as battalion guns. Even the number of guns assigned differed; General Knox maintained a steady ratio of two field pieces per company operating as brigade guns, typically three-pounders or four-pounders, while the British model assigned two detachments, each typically with two six-pounders, to each brigade. Due to this arrangement, in a hypothetical toe-to-toe engagement between the typical Continental infantry brigade against a British brigade, the British would out-gun the Americans four guns to two, a sizable difference that both American and British commanders contemplated in combat operations, especially as seen during the Battle of Monmouth.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Pattison Takes Command}

In 1773, as tensions increased with the Thirteen Colonies, Great Britain deployed the entire 4\textsuperscript{th} Battalion of Royal Artillery to North America, seven companies initially to New York and one to Newfoundland.\textsuperscript{15} This proved to be a unique situation, unprecedented in the history of the Royal Artillery, as the full headquarters staff for the battalion also traveled to North America. Pattison,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} McKenney, \textit{Organizational History of Field Artillery}, 12-13.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Duncan, \textit{History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery}, 270.
\end{itemize}
however, did not travel to North America with the battalion’s deployment as he was completing other services abroad; once finished, he returned to England. The only other member of the 4th Battalion not to travel overseas was the battalion’s commandant, Colonel Thomas Ord, who remained in England due to illness. Companies from the 1st and 3rd Battalions were later added to those of the 4th Battalion once the Revolutionary War commenced in 1775; these additional companies, along with the 4th Battalion, were formed together as the Brigade of Artillery in North America under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Cleveland. Due to his position, serving as the Chief of Artillery for the British Army in North America and chief liaison of this force to the Board of Ordnance, Cleveland was given the army rank of Colonel and given the local rank of Brigadier-General.16

This arrangement lasted until 1777, when, in April, the 4th Battalion’s commander, Colonel Ord, died in England. Lieutenant Colonel Pattison, next in line to command the battalion, was elevated to Colonel and left England to assume command over the British artillery forces in North America. Cleveland, now superseded by Pattison, who had the greater seniority, was ordered to return to England to await his next assignment, which would come in 1781 when he received promotion to full colonel in the Royal Artillery upon assuming command of the 3rd Battalion. Pattison arrived in New York in September, 1777; by October, he joined up with the main British force under General Sir William Howe, then occupying the Continental capital of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Pattison, upon fully relieving Cleveland of his duties in November, also received

16 Duncan, *History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery*, 301; *A List of the General and Field Officers, as They Rank in the Army; of the Officers in the Several Regiments of Horse, Dragoons, and Foot, on the British and Irish Establishments, (To Which is Now Added an Alphabetical Index); The Royal Regiment of Artillery, and Corps of Engineers, the Irish Artillery and Engineers, and the Marines on Full and Half Pay, with the Dates of Their Commissions, as They Rank in Each Corps and in the Army; the Governors, Lieutenant Governors, Etc. of His Majesty’s Garrisons at Home and Abroad, with Their Allowances; All the Officers on Half-Pay; and a Succession of Colonels, with the Uniforms to Each Regiment, from the New Order for Clothing, Etc., 1778* (London: J. Millan, 1778), 201.
the local rank of Brigadier-General as the new commander of the Brigade of Artillery for British forces in North America.\textsuperscript{17}

Brigadier-General James Pattison is important to this discussion for two reasons. First, Pattison was the British chief artillerist at the Battle of Monmouth, whose execution of artillery planning and operations dictated the manner that the Royal Artillery performed at the battle. Secondly, and more pertinent here, is that Pattison’s official papers serve as the best primary source extant on the Royal Artillery during the Monmouth campaign. The first collection within the \textit{Papers} of note is the Royal Artillery Brigade Orders, issued directly by Pattison, from September 28, 1777 to February 21, 1778; these orders, kept by Pattison’s brigade-major, detail the administration and discipline of the Artillery Brigade for that period. The second relevant collection is a copy of the British Army’s General Orders, issued by General Howe, and later, by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, for the same period (September 1777 to February 1778). The last important collection of the \textit{Pattison Papers} is the Letter Books, containing Pattison’s official correspondences between artillery and ordnance officials, spanning the period of October, 1777 to January, 1781.\textsuperscript{18}

Based upon the information presented in these sources, Pattison was extremely busy. He had direct command of the Artillery Brigade with the main British Army at Philadelphia and throughout the Monmouth campaign while he also directed the various other artillery forces under his purview in North America, including the remaining portions of the 4\textsuperscript{th} Battalion not with this main force, posted at such stations as New York, Nova Scotia, and Florida. In occupation duty at Philadelphia, he coordinated the manning and outfitting of redoubt gun emplacements to prevent Continental incursions. As the main liaison between the British Army and the Board of Ordnance,

\textsuperscript{18} Burton, “Introduction,” \textit{Pattison Papers}. 
Pattison organized war materiel shipments, using Board of Ordnance transport vessels, to and from Halifax, New York, and Philadelphia, as well as assembled and dispatched the transports assigned to begin the evacuation of British troops, artillery, and supplies out of Philadelphia in the spring of 1778.

What we know of the composition and operations of the British Brigade of Artillery comes from the Pattison Papers. An entry of the Brigade Orders for December 1, 1777 shows the full deployment of artillery detachment assignments to the various infantry battalions and brigades, including the number of men and types of guns. Additionally, we know from the Pattison Papers that General Pattison intended to maintain this very same organizational layout for the upcoming 1778 campaign season. The Brigade Orders for January 11, 1778 provide a full muster roll for all of the officers, in each company, of the 4th Battalion, a list which includes both those officers connected to the main British Army in the field as well as officers assigned to other locations. Finally, of greatest importance in understanding the disposition of artillery forces during the Battle of Monmouth itself are two letters written by Brigadier-General Pattison to Lord Townshend, Master-General of the Ordnance, the first of which was from May 22, 1778, which detailed the number of heavier artillery pieces being shipped directly to New York as well as the exact number of guns, and the type of guns, that Pattison planned to take with him on the march. The second letter, dated July 7, 1778, provides the composition of the British Army at Monmouth, gives some description of the assignment of guns to those forces, and details the actions of the artillery during and after the Battle of Monmouth.

19 Pattison, Royal Artillery Brigade Orders, Disposition of Officers and Men, December 1, 1777, 29, Pattison Papers.
20 Pattison, Royal Artillery Brigade Orders, November 20, 1777, 20, Pattison Papers.
Royal Artillery Disposition, December 1, 1777

23 Pattison, Royal Artillery Brigade Orders, Disposition of Officers and Men, December 1, 1777, 29, Pattison Papers.
The Royal Artillery’s Number of Guns in the Monmouth Campaign

In order to achieve a clearer picture of the use of the Royal Artillery during the battle, it is best to see what the sources, found within the Pattison Papers and elsewhere, say regarding the number and types of guns operating with the British Army during the Monmouth campaign. A distinction should be made at this point between the complete number of guns and those actually used in combat during the battle, the latter being a subject which will be covered later in this discussion.

In his letter to Lord Townshend on May 22, 1778, shortly before the British Army’s departure from Philadelphia, Brigadier-General Pattison details succinctly the total number of guns
at his disposal and what he planned to do with them. Pattison states that he was shipping the following pieces of heavy ordnance, via sea, to New York:

![Diagram of artillery ordnance]

**Royal Artillery Shipped to New York, May, 1778**

This shipment, primarily of heavier artillery pieces, by ship was done for two important reasons. Pattison indicates that the new British commander in North America, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, wanted to consolidate a battering force of artillery in New York in preparation for siege warfare should conditions warrant it in the campaign seasons to come. Many of these heavy guns were used in defense of Philadelphia, being positioned at established redoubts to the north of town during the previous winter as part of the British occupation. Secondly, and more practically, the shipment of these artillery pieces by Ordnance and naval vessels also lessened the burden of having to haul these larger guns and siege equipment over land. Relieved of these unnecessary siege pieces, Pattison immediately looked to forming up his far more necessary field artillery force for the upcoming march across New Jersey.

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Pattison knew that while the British Army was on the march across the Jerseys, it would be vulnerable to attack by Continental forces if not properly supported by field artillery. He also knew that he had to maintain the smallest number of guns possible while on this march in order to not slow down the British column, a collection of humanity already encumbered by loyalist refugees from Philadelphia, their baggage, and the essential provisions of the army. The May 22, 1778 letter to Lord Townsend once again provides Pattison’s plan, “the Field Art.y we are to march with will consist of 46 pieces of canon…Medium 12 Prs. 2, Light Do. 4, 6 Prs. 26, 3 Prs. 12, 5 ½ How.rs 2, each Gun compleated with 150 R.ds of Ammunition.”

This model matches exactly with the disposition of December 1777, to the very number and type of guns. The following chart shows how these numbers match the earlier disposition:

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Based on this matching set of numbers, Pattison used the same arrangement of forces for the Monmouth campaign as the Artillery Brigade had operated under during the previous campaign season and the early days of the Philadelphia occupation.

Pattison’s letters describe not only how the artillery was deployed for this campaign, but also how the British army was organized for the Battle of Monmouth. Pattison’s letter to Lord Townsend in the aftermath of the battle, dated July 7, 1778, describes the state of the army, with its artillery, in exacting detail:

The army continued to march in two columns, the first led by the Commander in Chief [General Clinton], with Lord Cornwallis, taking the left hand road, and the 2nd the right hand…In the 1st Column was the 5th Brigade of British Infantry, together with part of the Chessuvers & Provincial cavalry, forming an advanced Corps under Brigadier-General Leslie, and followed by the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry, the 16th Dragoons, British and Hessian Grenadiers, the Brigade of Guards,

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and the 3rd & 4th Brigades of British Infantry, together with two Medium 12 Prs. & one 5 ½ Howitzer, besides the 6 Prs. attached to the different brigades.

The second Column [commanded by Lieutenant General Wilhelm von Knyphausen] consisting of the 2nd Battalion of Light Infantry, the 1st & 2nd Brigades of British, then of Sterne & Walworth [Hessian brigades], the Park of Artillery, Provision Train & Baggage of the Army, the 17th Reg.t of Dragoons with two or three battalions of foot occasionally forming the Rear Guard, & two or three Provincial battalions covering the flanks.  

It is the first column, mentioned in the above account, which is of higher significance to the discussion in this article. The first column, under the combined leadership of Clinton and Cornwallis, was the one that was engaged at the Battle of Monmouth. The second column, led by General von Knyphausen, was further up the road, and was engaged in protecting the army’s provisions and baggage as well as the Loyalist refugees fleeing under the protection of the army. The second column was in no position to assist the first column substantially; besides being distant from the first column, it was dealing with Continental militia harassment not directly involved with the battle. Based on this account and the conclusions gleaned from the May 22 letter, the first Column went into this battle with a total of 25 pieces of artillery: 6 three-pounders, 16 six-pounders, two medium twelve-pounders, and one 5 ½ inch “royal” howitzer.

**The Identity of Royal Artillery Units**

Having established the number of field pieces with the Royal Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth, it is important to come towards a clearer understanding of the actual units involved in the fighting. This effort, however, is made difficult because the exact identification of the units engaged were never fully made. What is known, however, are which companies were present with the British Army during this campaign, which Royal Artillery captains were especially called out

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for recognition following the battle, and, lastly, some extrapolations can be made by the report of other British officers involved in combat at Monmouth.

The *Pattison Papers*, in various instances, offers the best evidence for the makeup of the Royal Artillery forces with the British Army during the Monmouth campaign. The 4th Battalion of the Royal Artillery was comprised of eight full companies, and, as has been previously mentioned, was fully present in North America during the American Revolutionary War. Brigadier-General Pattison’s Brigade Orders for January 11, 1778 provides a muster for the officers of each of these eight companies. Based on excerpts from the *Pattison Papers*, however, only five of these companies were actually with the British Army at Philadelphia and Monmouth.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Martin's Company (1st Co.)</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Buchanan's Company (2nd Co.)</td>
<td>General Clinton's Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain Anderson's Company (3rd Co.)</td>
<td>General Clinton's Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain Farrington's Company (4th Co.)</td>
<td>General Clinton's Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>The late Captain Jones' Company (5th Co.)</td>
<td>General Clinton's Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain Davis' Company (6th Co.)</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Stewart's Company (7th Co.)</td>
<td>General Clinton's Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain Johnston's Company (8th Co.)</td>
<td>Detachments across North America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Company Assignments of the 4th Battalion, Royal Artillery

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31 Pattison, Brigade Orders, February 10, 1778, 177, *Pattison Papers*.
The five companies of the 4th Battalion in Sir Henry Clinton’s army were also supported by three other Royal Artillery companies, two of the 1st Battalion under Captains Williamson and Standish, and a company of the 3rd Battalion under Captain Traille.33

In May of 1778, just prior to departing Philadelphia, Pattison ordered the majority of Captain Farrington’s company to supplement the single artillery detachment stationed at Halifax; only four officers and 40 men were to embark immediately for this reassignment, the rest of the company, along with the company’s commander and a Lieutenant Shand, would follow at the soonest possible opportunity. This opportunity, however, would not come until sometime after the Battle of Monmouth.34 Based on these sources, the British Army had seven full companies and portions of an eighth company of the Royal Artillery at its disposal at Monmouth.

![Royal Artillery Brigade in General Clinton's Army]

Companies of the Brigade of Royal Artillery, Clinton’s Army

This information shows the full extent of artillery unit identities with the British Army; only a small portion of this force actually saw combat during the Monmouth campaign. While no detailed listing of the artillery detachments assigned to Lord Cornwallis’ column is known to exist,

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an excerpt from the *Pattison Paper* provides some clues as to which units were more intimately involved with the fighting in the battle. In his July 7, 1778 letter to Lord Townshend, General Pattison calls out four captains in particular for their actions in the great afternoon cannonade of the battle: Captains Williamson, Standish, Scott, and Shand.\(^{35}\) The first two captains listed, Williamson and Standish, were the company commanders of the two artillery companies of the 1\(^{st}\) Battalion present in General Clinton’s army.

The other two “captains” listed, however, are harder to explain from what is known of these officers; neither of these men were company commanders as evidenced by artillery brigade orders or muster rolls. “Captain” Scott does not appear on the 4\(^{th}\) Battalion muster roll, so it may be safe to venture that he was a Captain Lieutenant, and not a full Captain, in one of the companies of the 1\(^{st}\) or 3\(^{rd}\) Battalions. This is also supported by the presence of Scott’s name as one of the “captains” on the “Disposition of Officers and Men” in December, 1777. That listing had other officers listed as “captains,” despite their actual rank being that of Captain Lieutenants; officers at this rank served more as junior or second captains rather than senior subalterns and were often called in passing “Captain.”\(^{36}\) The final officer mentioned, Shand, was listed in a letter by Pattison in May of 1778 as a Lieutenant of Captain Farrington’s Company, 4\(^{th}\) Battalion; the January 11, 1778 Muster Roll for the 4\(^{th}\) Battalion supports this, listing Shand as the company’s 1\(^{st}\) Lieutenant. This mention of Shand as a “Captain” is possible under two possible scenarios: 1\(^{st}\) Lieutenant Shand being promoted just prior to the Battle of Monmouth to the rank of Captain Lieutenant, or, Shand was promoted to that rank due to his gallant service at Monmouth, following the battle.\(^{37}\)

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Another officer to receive mention following the Battle of Monmouth, Lieutenant Vaughan, was sadly in connection to his death during the battle. This comes once again in the July 7, 1778 letter from Pattison to Lord Townshend, offering a full report of the battle, the Royal Artillery’s accolades in combat, and a report of the unit’s relatively light losses.\(^{38}\) While not much else was reported in connection to his death in battle, earlier passages from the Pattison Papers may shed light on Lieutenant Vaughan’s duties during the Monmouth campaign. The December, 1777 “Disposition of Officers and Men” lists Lieutenant Vaughan as the commander of the battalion guns, two six-pounders, assigned to the 1\(^{st}\) Battalion of Grenadiers. Following this, the Brigade Orders for December 29, 1777 recalled all brigade and battalion gun detachments back into the Artillery Park for the duration of winter quarters, with the exception of the two detachments serving with both grenadier battalions.\(^{39}\) Based on this evidence, it is probable that Lieutenant Vaughan, still commanding the battalion guns of the 1\(^{st}\) Grenadier Battalion during the Battle of Monmouth, may have lost his life during a portion of the battle in which the grenadiers were engaged in combat.

A final mention of a Royal Artillery officer comes from the diary of grenadier officer Lieutenant William Hale, of the 2\(^{nd}\) Grenadier Battalion. Describing the afternoon cannonade, he writes, “our shells and our twelves, which were admirably conducted by a Capt. Williams, did most horrible execution among their line drawn up on the hill.”\(^{40}\) According to Lieutenant Hale’s account, the two medium 12-pounders and the howitzer of Lord Cornwallis’ column, assigned as a heavy reserve, were under the command of Captain Lieutenant Edward Williams, of the late Captain Thomas Jones’ Company, 4\(^{th}\) Battalion, Royal Artillery. This matches the same

\(^{39}\) Pattison, Brigade Orders, Disposition of Officers and Men, December 1, 1777, 29, \textit{Pattison Papers}; Pattison, Brigade Orders, December 29, 1777, 74, \textit{Pattison Papers}.
deployment scheme utilized in the December 1777 “Disposition,” which also had a collection of heavier field pieces and howitzers under the command of captains and captain lieutenants.\textsuperscript{41}

Based on the above analysis of the primary sources, it is fair to say that potentially six officers have been identified as participating in the Battle of Monmouth. Most of these men represent the commanders of both companies from the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion (Captain Williamson and Captain Standish) and the executive officers of two companies (the 4\textsuperscript{th} and 5\textsuperscript{th}) from the 4\textsuperscript{th} Battalion. Having now identified the number of guns employed by the British Army, and having identified certain key units and individuals, it is possible to depict the deployment and actions of the Royal Artillery during the Monmouth campaign.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Officer} & \textbf{Company} & \textbf{Battalion} & \textbf{Possible Detachment Assignment} \\
\hline
Capt. John Williamson & Capt. Williamson’s Co. & 1st Battalion & Unknown \\
Capt. David Standish & Capt. Standish’s Co. & 1st Battalion & Unknown \\
Capt. Lt. Scott & Unknown & 1st Battalion & Unknown \\
Capt. Lt. Alexander Shand & Capt. Farrington’s Co. & 4th Battalion & Unknown \\
Capt. Lt. Edward Williams & The late Capt. Jones’ Co. & 4th Battalion & 2 medium 12-pounders, 1 howitzer; assigned as heavy artillery reserve for Cornwallis’ column. \\
Lt. T. L. Vaughan & Unknown & 1st Battalion & Battalion guns (2 6-pounders), 1st Battalion of Grenadiers \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Royal Artillery Officers Identified in the \textit{Pattison Papers} & Other Sources}
\end{table}

\textbf{The Deployment of the Royal Artillery at Monmouth}

Evidence for the movement of the forces engaged during the Battle of Monmouth comes from many different sources, including diaries, after-action reports, and court-martial transcripts. However, one of the strongest visual sources that document the military deployment and engagements during this particular battle can be found in the maps created immediately following the battle. One of the best maps depicting the British perspective of this campaign is the “Battle of Monmouth” map found in the \textit{Henry Clinton Papers} at the University of Michigan’s Clement

\textsuperscript{41} Pattison, Brigade Orders, Disposition of Officers of the Several Companies, January 11, 1778, 110, \textit{Pattison Papers}; Pattison, Brigade Orders, Disposition of Officers and Men, December 1, 1777, 29, \textit{Pattison Papers}.\textsuperscript{41}
Library. It is perhaps one of the best sources depicting the movement of British forces, and for the British perspective of the location of Continental forces in relationship to its own army, it also serves, in conjunction to what is known through the *Pattison Papers*, as the best means to document the movement and actions of the Royal Artillery during the battle.

The British Army departed Philadelphia on June 17, 1778; although the *Pattison Papers* do not present exact orders from Brigadier-General Pattison assigning specific artillery detachments to the various infantry formations of the army, the *Papers* make it clear that these orders had already been in effect. In his July 7, 1778 letter to Lord Townshend, Pattison detailed the full British order of march. As has been previously mentioned, only one of the two columns in the British Army, Lord Cornwallis’ column, was actually engaged in combat; the other portion of the army, Lieutenant General von Knyphausen’s column, did not participate in the fighting.\(^4^2\)

First contact with Continental forces by elements of the Royal Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth was made in the mid-morning of the battle. Major General Charles Lee, commanding the advance corps of the Continental Army, launched a late-morning attack against the British Army’s rear-guard just northeast of the modern-day Borough of Freehold, New Jersey on June 28, 1778. The British rear-guard consisted of the 16\(^{th}\) Light Dragoons, the Queen’s Rangers, and the 1\(^{st}\) Battalion of Light Infantry. This light infantry unit was assigned a battalion gun detachment of two 3-pounders; it was this detachment that served as the sole artillery defense for the British rear-guard, performing this role against Lee’s attack until British reinforcements arrived.\(^4^3\) As the commander of the Brigade of Artillery for the British Army at Monmouth and the senior artillery


advisor to General Clinton himself, it is very possible that Brigadier-General Pattison came up at this time as well; this is only conjecture, however, as there is nothing in the primary sources to confirm or refute this speculation.

The vanguard of Lord Cornwallis’ column was the two battalions of British grenadiers and the British Brigade of Guards, also comprised of two battalions. Each of these battalions, four in total, had been assigned battalion gun detachments, each with two 6-pounders, for a combined artillery firepower of eight 6-pounders. Following the collapse of Lee’s initial attack against the British rear-guard and the Continental force’s subsequent retreat westward towards General Washington’s main body, it was this group of British grenadiers and guards, aided by the 16th Dragoons, which spearheaded the main pursuit of Lee and his men. Added to this force was the heavy artillery reserve of two medium 12-pounders and the one 5 ½ inch “royal” howitzer under the command of Captain Lieutenant Williams; it was these eleven artillery pieces that later made up the British grand battery during the “Great Cannonade” in the afternoon phases of the Battle.\(^{44}\)

The London Chronicle, in its September 17-19, 1778 edition, published a private letter from a Bostonian, dated July 23rd, stating:

The incessant and alert fire of the British artillery, cannot be too much commended the day of the action at Freehold. The battalion guns of the guards, with the two 12-pounders, covered the troops after the charge throughout the wood, morass and field in front of the second wood, where they were ordered to halt, spent with heat, thirst, and fatigue. The fire was so well kept up, that they expended from eighty to ninety rounds in a short period, while the remains of the advanced corps of the enemy were falling back on their second line.\(^{45}\)

Not all of the artillery with Clinton and Cornwallis participated in the main pursuit and subsequent “Great Cannonade.” Following the arrival of Cornwallis’ column, the remainder of the

\(^{44}\) “Battle of Monmouth, 28th June 1778” [map]; Pattison, Brigade Orders, Brigade Orders, Disposition of Officers and Men, December 1, 1777, 29, Pattison Papers.

British rear-guard, the Queen’s Rangers and the British 1st Battalion of Light Infantry, along with its aforementioned battalion guns, broke off from the main pursuit and, under Brigadier-General Sir William Erskine, took a northwestward path beyond the Spotswood North Brook in an attempt to find and attack the left flank of the Continental Army. This effort ultimately failed as these forces were slowed by the New Jersey Militia under Major General Philemon Dickenson, aided by a company of Continental artillery, along with support from Continental reserves under Major General Marquis de Lafayette.46

Three British infantry brigades also formed a part of Cornwallis’ column, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Brigades, each with its own set of brigade gun detachments. The 3rd Brigade, with its four 6-pounders, pursued a smaller segment of Continentals under Brigadier General Charles Scott as he and his detachment retreated across the farm fields between the Spotswood North Brook and Middle Brook. The 4th Brigade with its brigade guns, also four 6-pounders, occupied a position to the rear of the grenadiers and guards on the battlefield in the vicinity of the Middle Morass, also called Division Ditch; most accounts indicate that these forces did not see combat. Finally, the brigade guns of the 5th Brigade, a lighter artillery force of four 3-pounders, served with its infantry components in an extreme reserve position, taking up a defensive post in the area of the village of Monmouth Courthouse itself; due to this position, this unit did not see fighting as well.47

46 “Battle of Monmouth, 28th June 1778” [map]; Pattison, Brigade Orders, Brigade Orders, Disposition of Officers and Men, December 1, 1777, 29, Pattison Papers.
47 Ibid.
The most notable of the actions performed by the Royal Artillery at Monmouth was performed during the afternoon’s “Great Cannonade.” Lee’s forces successfully escaped across the “West Morass” (the Spotswood Middle Brook) to the safety of the main line of General Washington’s Continental Army. The British pursuit stopped as Continental Artillery pieces on Perrine Hill began firing on British troops, forcing them back to heights along a hedgerow fence line separating the Parsonage and Rhea farms. From this position, the Royal Artillery formed its “grand battery,” returned fire, and, for more than three hours, participated in the great barrage with solid shot from its 6-pounders and 12-pounders and shell from its howitzer.48

Pattison had only great praise for the conduct of the Royal Artillery during this action. The July 7th letter to Lord Townshend states, “they sustained a very heavy cannonade…the officers & men behav’d with their usual conduct & bravery, as all the Army loudly testify.”49 Royal Artillery

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historian Francis Duncan, in his History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, presents the official congratulations offered by Pattison to his men following the battle:

The very handsome and obliging terms in which the General Officers and others have repeatedly spoken of the appearance, discipline, and good order of the Corps of Artillery, and particularly of the conduct, care and attention of all the officers who have been detached with the several Brigades and Battalion guns, cannot fail to be highly pleasing and satisfactory to the Brigadier-General. He therefore takes this occasion to give them his best thanks, and to express further his entire approbation of the regularity and observance of duties that have been shown by all ranks during the late march, and of the cheerfulness and alacrity with which they have undergone the great fatigue of it.  

There is some controversial ambiguity, however, that arises from a modern study of the number of guns with the British grand battery during the “Great Cannonade.” Certain period sources outside the Pattison Papers present varying gun counts for the British grand battery amassed during that portion of the battle. An example comes from the account of grenadier Lieutenant Hale, who states that there were, “on our side two medium twelves, as many howitzers and 6 six-pounders.” Based on Hale’s account, the grand battery gun count equals ten guns, not the eleven accounted for this group of artillery pieces in the Pattison Papers. This cannot be accurate; it adds an additional howitzer (two instead of one) and does not account for another two 6-pounders known to be with this formation (six instead of eight).

What might account for these confused numbers? It is likely that the chaos of battle and the fog of war may account for these inconsistent numbers; Lieutenant Hale was in some of the thickest portions of the fighting and likely could not obtain a full view of the battlefield, his unit being in constant action, and would not have the necessary time to accurately count and identify the artillery pieces for the Royal Artillery in the “Great Cannonade.”

50 Duncan, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, 322.
51 Wilkin, Some British Soldiers in America, 260.
A final piece of evidence provides silent testimony to the existence of eleven British guns present in the afternoon artillery barrage, the Clinton map of the Battle of Monmouth. If examined closely, the map shows at Item “X,” which according to the map legend denotes the location of the British artillery, exactly eleven dots, used by the mapmaker to indicate artillery emplacements, at the British position on the Hedgerow during the afternoon cannonade. There are also eleven cannon fire trajectories coming from the eleven guns depicted as well.

Clinton’s Map “Battle of Monmouth, 28 June 1778” – Royal Artillery Guns at the Hedgerow during the Great Cannonade.  

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52 “Battle of Monmouth” [map], Clinton Papers.
This visual evidence, in addition to the gun count figures presented in the *Pattison Papers*, provide the most accurate accounting of the number of guns present with the Royal Artillery at the Hedgerow during the “Great Cannonade.”

What is also interesting about the Clinton “Battle of Monmouth” map is what it tells us about the Great Cannonade itself. Unique to almost every other narration and depiction of this phase of the battle is its presentation of the Continental Artillery firing upon the British Army from three different positions (not just the traditional two positions of Perrine Hill and Combs Hill) and the Royal Artillery responding through counter-fire upon two of these positions. This is entirely novel and worthy of further research. What it shows, however, may explain why the British Army could no longer hold out at the Hedgerow, being fired upon from three separate locations. Pivoting to answer fire from two positions, the Royal Artillery simply could not adjust to return fire on a third position, whether it was from the traditionally known emplacement that opened up later in the afternoon from Combs Hill or an additional position that opened up on Perrine Hill in support of the main Continental grand battery further up the ridge. Unable to respond in kind, and unable to protect its vulnerable infantry formations arrayed behind its own artillery, the British Army had no other alternative than to redeploy to the rear.

Clinton’s Map “Battle of Monmouth, 28 June 1778” – A New Perspective on the “Great Cannonade.” 53

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53 “Battle of Monmouth” [map], *Clinton Papers.*
The British forces that had marched and fought since early morning finally pulled back once all Continental efforts to pursue them ended with the coming of nightfall. Around midnight, under cover of darkness, the British Army pulled out of the vicinity of the battlefield and Freehold, reconnected with von Knyphausen’s column, and continued on to its intended destination of Sandy Hook, New Jersey. 54 Washington’s Army, just as spent, and having achieved its own objective of harassment of the enemy across New Jersey, did not pursue.

Conclusion

For a battle touted as the largest field artillery battle of the Revolutionary War, the story of the Royal Artillery during the Battle of Monmouth has been seldom explored. With this analysis, however, the role of this prestigious service during the Monmouth campaign, its composition, leadership, tactical deployment, and its impact on the battle itself can now be examined in much greater detail.

The meager discussion of the Royal Artillery in this battle over the years has only left scholars and students of the battle with more questions than answers, accompanied with a distorted and incomplete understanding of the role and impact this artillery organization had at Monmouth. Highly relied-upon sources disagree over artillery numbers and offer only scant views into the artillery situation in this campaign, instead focusing on infantry formations or leadership personalities.

In examining the specific primary sources, chief among them being the Pattison Papers, illuminating features and important interpretive details become apparent. These sources offer a concrete number of guns (46 artillery pieces) with the British army on the march from Philadelphia; it also tells us how many guns, 25 pieces, and their type, were used by the only

element of that army, Lord Cornwallis’ column, to see combat during the battle. The Papers give us a distribution of artillery detachments from a slightly earlier period that match exactly in number to those at Monmouth, offering the best model for a possible deployment plan implemented by Brigadier-General Pattison himself. The Pattison Papers also offer up names in the artillery leadership, providing the best evidence in identifying certain companies and elements that engaged in the fighting, most especially in the key fighting of the initial pursuit of retreating Continental forces and during the hours-long afternoon artillery barrage known locally as the “Great Cannonade.”

Ultimately, as with any analysis into a seldom understood and under-examined historical subject, for every answer that presents itself, three more questions arise. In uncovering the role played by the Royal Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth, these discoveries reveal many more facets that need fresh investigation, not only in those focusing on the Royal Artillery itself, but, not surprisingly, with a focus on the Continental artillery present in the afternoon phases of the battle.

What is clear is that the Royal Artillery played a pivotal and key role at the Battle of Monmouth, a role that, through the material presented here, will, hopefully, lead to better understanding and spawn future research. What this reevaluated information and knowledge tells us, in refreshing detail, is that the artillery of both sides in this battle, in many ways more than infantry, shaped the ultimate course and outcome of Monmouth, in many ways confirming the opinion of some historians over time that the Battle of Monmouth truly was “an artillery battle supported by infantry,” rather than the opposite and more common occurrence.
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